NGOs and influence diplomacy

From the OSS to the CIA: the legacy of war

During the Second World War, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), forerunner of the CIA, was at the heart of the first major American experiments in psychological warfare. As early as that period, the United States understood that winning on the military battlefield was not enough: it was also necessary to convince, influence and shape minds. The OSS worked with religious, trade-union and media networks to spread narratives favourable to the Allies and to discredit the Axis powers. After 1945, the CIA took over these tools and systematised them. One of the first architects of this strategy was George Kennan, diplomat and theorist of “containment”. In his 1948 memorandum, he argued for “organised political warfare” aimed at directly influencing the civil societies of adversaries^[1]. This document opened a new era, in which covert operations became a standard instrument of foreign policy. The first major test took place in Italy that same year. Fearing an electoral victory by the Communist Party, Washington mobilised the CIA to fund Catholic trade unions, cultural associations and pro-Western newspapers. The money came partly through covert channels, but the results were visible: the Christian Democrats won the elections. This episode, extensively documented by the CIA itself^[2], established a method that would be replicated elsewhere: using local actors to influence an election or an entire society, while retaining the possibility of denying any official interference. Over the following decades, the CIA multiplied its experiments: funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its intellectual journals (Encounter, an English-language review published in London from 1953, Preuves, a French-language review launched in Paris in 1951 and intended to reach French and European intellectuals), support for arts festivals, creation of radio stations such as Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty, and discreet backing for anti-communist trade unions in Europe and Latin America. Everywhere, civil society was becoming a battlefield.

The scandals of the 1970s

As early as 1967, the New York Times and Ramparts magazine exposed the CIA’s secret funding of student and cultural associations. American public opinion, marked by the Vietnam War and domestic protest, discovered that organisations presented as independent were in fact being run from Langley. The Church and Pike committees, set up by Congress in the 1970s, confirmed the scale of the phenomenon^[3].

They revealed large-scale programmes of cultural manipulation, attempts to destabilise foreign governments and interference in elections. The scandal was such that the CIA lost part of its credibility and had to close or transform some of its relays. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, stricter oversight was imposed. Every covert operation now had to receive presidential approval. While this measure complicated interventions, it did not abolish the underlying logic: Washington still sought to influence foreign civil society, but had to do so more visibly or through “neutral” intermediaries. This constraint led to the invention of new structures capable of taking over these missions behind a façade of transparency.

The creation of the NED

It was Ronald Reagan who gave fresh impetus in 1983 by creating the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The idea was simple: to do openly what the CIA had been doing in secret. Officially, the NED was intended to support democracy and human rights. In practice, it took over the role of funding parties, media, trade unions and NGOs in countries deemed strategic. Carl Gershman, its founder, explained as early as 1986 that the NED made it possible to fund the same actors as the CIA, but openly and in a less compromising way^[4]. The institution was organised around four branches: the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Solidarity Center and the Center for International Private Enterprise. This architecture guaranteed bipartisan support, strengthening the organisation’s legitimacy and avoiding internal political quarrels. In the 1980s and 1990s, the NED played an active role in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador), in Asia (the Philippines, South Korea) and in Eastern Europe. It funded Polish trade unions close to Solidarnosc, supported independent media in communist countries and encouraged democratic transitions. For its supporters, it helped to weaken authoritarian regimes. For its critics, it merely imposed a model of society aligned with Washington, bypassing national sovereignty.

USAID: at the heart of American soft power

This influence diplomacy is not, however, limited to bodies that openly acknowledge their political aims. It also relies on agencies with a more technical and humanitarian profile.

Created in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has the official mission of coordinating civilian development aid. Its budget, which ranges between 25 and 35 billion dollars a year depending on the financial year, makes it one of Washington’s most powerful financial levers in diplomacy. Unlike the NED, which openly presents itself as a tool for promoting democracy, USAID claims a humanitarian and technical mandate: food assistance, public health, infrastructure, governance.

Behind this façade, the agency often plays a decisive political role. During the Cold War, it was used to strengthen allied regimes by directly funding civil servants’ salaries or supporting media considered strategic. In Latin America, USAID heavily funded “modernisation” programmes that in reality accompanied counter-insurgency. In the former USSR and Eastern Europe, it invested massively from the 1990s onwards to foster the transition to a market economy and to support pro-Western associative networks.

In Ukraine, its role was particularly visible: up to 90% of the funding of some media outlets came from USAID grants, which created a structural dependency. The agency also covered direct social spending, such as the payment of pensions and civil servants’ salaries, blurring the line between humanitarian aid and political support. Its critics accuse it of acting as a civilian front for American foreign policy, while its defenders point out that it makes it possible to provide concrete and rapid aid in crisis situations.

George Soros and the political economy of private foundations

Alongside government agencies such as USAID and the NED, private foundations are another pillar of American influence diplomacy. Among them, the network of Open Society Foundations created by George Soros has played a major role since the 1990s. Presented as philanthropic, these foundations have funded universities, NGOs and independent media in more than 100 countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, they trained a generation of political and intellectual elites favourable to Euro-Atlantic integration. Since their creation, their cumulative spending has exceeded 23 billion USD^[5], which makes them, together with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation^[6] and the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the most influential philanthropic networks in the world. The Soros foundation, however, has a more political orientation.

Their action is often aligned with Washington’s strategic priorities. In Ukraine, for example, the Soros foundations supported economic and institutional reforms that coincided with the opening of the energy sector to Western multinationals. Their financial and symbolic weight has fuelled the perception of a political agenda hidden behind philanthropy.

For their supporters, the Open Society Foundations defend academic freedom, human rights and transparency. For their critics, they embody private interference and collusion between money, ideology and geopolitics. The influence of Soros, who is also one of the main donors to the Democratic Party, illustrates how porous the boundary between philanthropic action and political strategy is.

A few examples

Iran

Iran was one of the CIA’s first laboratories outside Europe. In 1953, Operation Ajax, conducted jointly by the British (MI6) and American services, aimed to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, guilty of having nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The strategy combined propaganda, the mobilisation of associations and clerics, the funding of demonstrations and economic pressure. Local networks, sometimes presented as “civil organisations”, played a crucial role in spreading rumours and organising street protests. Mossadegh’s fall allowed the return to power of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was backed by Washington for more than twenty-five years. This interference left a deep mark on Iranian collective memory: it fuelled a lasting distrust of the United States and of NGOs perceived as instruments of manipulation, and it remains a constant reference in the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic.

Guatemala

Guatemala was the CIA’s first major theatre of operations in Latin America. In 1951, the democratically elected president Jacobo Árbenz launched a sweeping agrarian reform aimed at redistributing land hitherto largely held by the United Fruit Company, an American multinational close to the circles of power in Washington. This policy was immediately perceived as a strategic and economic threat. In 1954, the CIA carried out Operation PBSUCCESS, combining a radio propaganda campaign, funding of opponents, psychological operations and logistical support for an expeditionary force led by Carlos Castillo Armas. Árbenz was forced to resign, paving the way for a military regime aligned with American interests. This coup is considered the CIA’s first great victory in Latin America, but it also ushered in a long period of instability and political violence in the country, with a civil war that would last several decades.

Egypt

In Egypt, the British and American services saw very early on the usefulness of religious actors in containing Arab nationalism. Faced with Gamal Abdel Nasser, who embodied an independent path close to the USSR, MI6 and the CIA established contacts in the 1950s with the Muslim Brotherhood, used as an ideological and social counterweight. This instrumentalisation of an Islamist movement ushered in a logic that would extend over the long term: supporting certain religious currents in order to counter political adversaries, even at the risk of fostering the emergence of more radical forces. Indeed, networks stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood would later feed movements such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas or the Islamic State, illustrating the harmful effects of these alliances of convenience. It may be noted that these Islamist organisations would subsequently justify numerous interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, …).

Chile

From the late 1960s, the United States saw the rise of Salvador Allende as a strategic threat, fearing that a Marxist government would spread like wildfire across Latin America. The CIA then funded trade unions, associations and newspapers hostile to Allende in order to weaken his social base. Millions of dollars were invested to support massive strikes, notably in the transport and distribution sectors, which paralysed the Chilean economy. After the 1973 military coup, American networks did not disappear: they turned to supporting moderate NGOs promoting a gradual and controlled transition. These actors, funded in part by the NED and American foundations, helped prepare the return to civilian rule at the end of the 1980s, while ensuring that political opening remained compatible with Western economic interests.

Serbia

At the end of the 1990s, Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia became another major target. The student movement Otpor!, founded in 1998, was quickly spotted and supported by organisations linked to the NED. Its activists received training in political communication and non-violent resistance, inspired by the methods of Gene Sharp. The funding made it possible to produce posters, leaflets and media campaigns on a scale unprecedented for a student movement. In 2000, Otpor! played a decisive role in the mobilisation that led to Milošević’s fall after the disputed presidential election. For its supporters, this victory was that of democracy over an authoritarian regime. For its critics, it illustrated how an opposition could be built and instrumentalised by outside actors. This “colour revolution” model would go on to inspire other movements in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine

Ukraine is undoubtedly the most emblematic and most structured case. From independence in 1991, the country became a priority for Washington and Brussels. Tens of millions of dollars were invested to support NGOs, independent media and pro-Western political parties. The 2004 Orange Revolution, triggered by elections marred by fraud, was strongly supported by this associative fabric funded by the NED, USAID and the European Union. In December 2013, Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State, publicly acknowledged that more than 5 billion dollars had been invested in Ukraine since 1991 to “support democracy”^[7].

During the Euromaidan in 2014, many Western-funded NGOs played a central role. They organised logistical supplies for the demonstrators, set up legal services for those arrested and relayed the mobilisation to the international media. After the fall of Viktor Yanukovych, they were directly involved in institutional and economic reforms. For some observers, these NGOs helped anchor Ukraine on a Euro-Atlantic trajectory, strengthening its sovereignty vis-à-vis Moscow. For others, they helped radicalise the confrontation with Russia by preventing the emergence of a middle way. The Ukrainian case thus reveals the full ambivalence of American influence diplomacy: a tool for supporting a civil society in struggle, but also a factor of polarisation and lasting geopolitical conflict.

Trump: the end of NGO funding?

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 marked a break in the historical continuity of American support for NGOs. Immediately after his inauguration, he signed an executive order freezing all foreign aid funding for 90 days, pending a full review of the programmes^[8]. This decision directly affected USAID, the main funder of NGOs, and raised concerns within the NED, which saw its traditional role called into question. In its wake, Congress adopted the Rescissions Act of 2025, cutting more than 8 billion dollars from international aid budgets, notably those of USAID and related bodies^[9]. Regulatory measures also stipulated that federal funding could no longer support NGOs deemed contrary to “national priorities”, targeting in particular those associated with progressive causes or linked to transnational networks such as George Soros’s Open Society Foundations^[10]. For the first time since their creation, the NED and USAID were therefore weakened not by outside opposition but by a domestic political decision.

However, the concrete effects of these measures are still being assessed. Although lawsuits forced the administration to grant partial waivers for certain emergency programmes, such as those related to global health, the effective dissolution of USAID led to the termination of thousands of grants, affecting NGOs in more than 60 countries.

Donald Trump’s challenge to NGO funding has highlighted a rift within the Republican Party. Some of its elected officials, close to nationalist and sovereigntist currents, support reducing or even abolishing USAID and the NED, which they regard as costly and contrary to the priority given to domestic affairs. Conversely, the interventionist wing of the GOP continues to see these instruments as essential for countering Russia, China or Iran. This divide reflects a strategic contradiction: on the one hand, a discourse calling for a break with “interference” abroad; on the other, a tradition of influence diplomacy that has shaped American policy since the Cold War. Trump’s election has thus crystallised this tension, showing that the question of the role of NGOs in foreign and domestic policy now openly divides the American political class.

Universal model or particular interests?

Seductive talk about promoting democracy, human rights and development often conceals a complex system in which geopolitical motives and particular interests are intertwined. While some interventions have accompanied stable transitions, others have helped destabilise entire regions.

The case of Iraq after 2003, that of Libya after 2011, or the persistent tensions in Ukraine illustrate the perverse effects of influence diplomacy. These failures reveal a fundamental contradiction: how can one claim to defend the sovereignty of peoples while massively interfering in their internal affairs?

The claim that the Western model is universal is perhaps the most problematic blind spot of this strategy. By postulating that liberal democracy and the market economy represent the unsurpassable horizon of any “modern” society, Washington and its relays neglect the cultural, historical and social specificities of the countries concerned. This teleological vision turns the diversity of human experience into so many stages to be passed on the way to the same predefined model. Decades of support for the Shah in Iran ultimately paved the way for Khomeini, revealing the unsuitability of the imposed model and the limits of a strategy designed first and foremost around external geopolitical interests.

70 years after the OSS’s first experiments, the question remains wide open: do these tools truly serve the emancipation of peoples, or do they merely dress up a sophisticated form of imperialism in idealism?

Marcan for BAM!

[1] National Security Council Report, NSC 68, ’United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’

[2] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

[3] Intelligence Related Commissions

[4] The National Endowment for Democracy Responds to Our Burma Nuclear Story -- And Our Response — ProPublica

[5] Financial Figures - Open Society Foundations

[6] The Gates Foundation

[7] Remarks at the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference

[8] Trump suspends US foreign assistance for 90 days pending reviews | AP News

[9] Rescissions Act of 2025 - Wikipedia

[10] New Executive Order Targets NGO Funding | Enforcement Edge | Blogs | Arnold & Porter