Hamas: Netanyahu’s golem?
While Netanyahu lambasts the countries and organisations that denounce the massacre of Palestinians, accusing them of complacency towards Hamas, history shows quite a different reality. For decades, numerous facts have attested that he helped support and strengthen the Islamist movement in Gaza, making it a central element of his political and security strategy.
The origins of Hamas in the 1970s and 1980s
Hamas grew out of Mujama al-Islamiya, an Islamic organisation founded in 1973 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the Gaza Strip. Officially a charity, this structure developed mosques, schools, clinics and libraries. It sought to strengthen religious practice and provide social services in a context dominated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat and his Fatah party, which saw itself as secular and nationalist[1].
In 1979, Mujama al-Islamiya was recognised by Israel as a charitable association, allowing it to raise funds and expand its presence. Several Israeli officials of the time would later admit that this recognition was part of a strategic logic: favouring the Islamists in order to weaken the PLO, perceived as the main threat[2]..
In 1984, arms caches were discovered in a mosque linked to Mujama. Ahmed Yassin was arrested, then released in 1985 after claiming that the weapons were intended to fight the PLO and not Israel. This explanation was considered flimsy, but it convinced the Israeli authorities, who preferred to see the growth of an Islamist actor likely to divide Palestinian society[3].
In 1987, against the backdrop of the first Intifada, Yassin and his associates founded Hamas. In 1988, the organisation’s charter called for the destruction of Israel and rejected a negotiated solution, enshrining all-out confrontation[4]. Despite this radical rhetoric, Israel continued to regard Fatah as the priority threat, which allowed Hamas to take root.
Oslo and the rise of Hamas in the 1990s
In 1993 and 1995, the Oslo Accords formalised mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and created the Palestinian Authority. Hamas rejected this process outright and launched a series of suicide attacks aimed at sabotaging the rapprochement. These attacks, notably in 1994 and 1996, deeply shocked Israeli public opinion[5].
In 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist, shattering the momentum for peace. Hamas emerged as a key player in the violence, but its development remained linked to the initial Israeli tolerance of the 1980s.
In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister by exploiting the fear generated by the Hamas attacks. His rival Shimon Peres, although the favourite, was weakened by this wave of attacks. Netanyahu campaigned against Oslo, claiming that Israel’s security depended on refusing concessions. In 2001, a video filmed when he was no longer Prime Minister showed him boasting of having put an end to Oslo and of having known how to manipulate Washington, confirming his intention to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state.
Withdrawal from Gaza in 2005
In 2000, the failure of the Camp David summit and Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Esplanade of the Mosques triggered the second Intifada. Hamas gained popularity thanks to its role in the uprising, while the PLO and Fatah appeared weakened and unable to advance the national cause. In 2004, Israel assassinated Ahmed Yassin, but the organisation remained solid.
In 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided on a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. The Israeli army left the Strip, but Israel retained control of the borders (except Rafah on the Egyptian side, subject to agreements), of airspace and maritime space, as well as of the population register, limiting Palestinian sovereignty[6].
This decision met several imperatives. In security terms, the Israeli army had to permanently mobilise thousands of soldiers to protect some 8,000 settlers living in the heart of a territory populated by more than a million Palestinians, a situation regarded as increasingly untenable and costly in human lives and resources. Internationally, Sharon was under pressure from the United States, with the Bush administration encouraging him to take a visible initiative to relaunch a peace process paralysed since the second Intifada. In domestic political terms, Sharon sought to regain the initiative: by carrying out a limited, unilateral withdrawal, he cut the ground from under the Israeli left while consolidating Israel’s control over the large settlement blocs in the West Bank, regarded as strategic. Sharon himself would later sum up his objective by explaining that disengagement from Gaza made it possible to “freeze the political process” with the Palestinians and to impose a new reality on the ground[7].
The 2006 elections and Palestinian division
In January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections. The vote was judged free and transparent by observers, but it caused an international shock. The United States, the European Union and Israel considered it unacceptable for an organisation classified as terrorist to govern. International aid was suspended.
In 2007, tensions degenerated into clashes. Hamas drove Fatah out of Gaza, and Fatah fell back to the West Bank. Palestine found itself lastingly divided between Hamas, master of Gaza, and a Palestinian Authority confined to Ramallah[8].
Netanyahu’s return and the consolidation of Hamas in Gaza
In 2009, Netanyahu returned to power with a clear line: to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state and maintain internal division. Several analysts point out that Hamas’s domination of Gaza served his objectives, as it made it possible to present the Palestinians as incapable of unity and therefore ineligible for international recognition[9].
In 2015, Bezalel Smotrich, a political ally of Netanyahu, declared that “the Palestinian Authority is a burden and Hamas an asset”, spelling out a logic in which the presence of Hamas, radical and unrecognised, blocks any prospect of a Palestinian state[10].
Qatari funding and suitcases of cash
From 2012, Qatar became Gaza’s main funder. The money, often in cash, regularly passed through Israel with the government’s consent. In November 2018, suitcases containing fifteen million dollars passed through the Erez crossing with Israel’s approval. These images, carried by the press, illustrate this unprecedented situation[11].
Officially, these funds were used to pay civil servants’ salaries and buy fuel, in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis. But many observers note that this mechanism above all allowed Hamas to remain in power. By authorising these transfers, Netanyahu guaranteed a status quo: Hamas held Gaza, the Palestinian Authority was sidelined and the prospect of a Palestinian state receded[12].
The Israeli opposition accuses Netanyahu of having fed Hamas to avoid any negotiation with Mahmoud Abbas. His supporters explain that it was a matter of buying calm. The result, nonetheless, is that Gaza remained under Hamas control, divided from the West Bank, while Netanyahu consolidated his domestic power by presenting himself as the sole guarantor of security against an implacable enemy.
Loss of control?
From the recognition of Mujama al-Islamiya in 1979 to the suitcases of cash in 2018, by way of the 2006 elections and Hamas’s seizure of power in Gaza in 2007, history shows a constant: Israel, and more particularly Benjamin Netanyahu, encouraged the consolidation of Hamas for purely strategic reasons. Hamas served as a tool of division, weakening the PLO and blocking the prospect of a unified Palestinian state. This choice allowed Hamas to finance its militarisation and take root in Gaza.
By supporting Hamas and torpedoing the Oslo Accords, Netanyahu undeniably helped perpetuate a spiral of violence for which both peoples are paying the price directly. Political responsibility for these victims, whether Israeli or Palestinian, cannot be dissociated from this strategic choice.
One question remains: has Hamas ceased to be a strategic asset for Netanyahu, or did this instrumentalisation serve to legitimise the military intervention in Gaza?
Marcan for BAM!
[1] Hamas | Definition, History, Ideology, & Facts | Britannica
[2] How Israel Helped To Spawn Hamas | PDF
[3] General Staff Report: Large Rise in Number of Rapes in IDF - Haaretz Com
[4] The Avalon Project : Hamas Covenant 1988
[5] Jaffa Road bus bombings - Wikipedia
[6] Retrait israélien de la bande de Gaza — Wikipédia
[7] Row erupts as top Sharon aide says there will be no Palestinian state | World news | The Guardian
[8] Hamas takes control of Gaza | Palestinian territories | The Guardian
[9] How Israel helped prop up Hamas for decades | Analyst News
[10] For years, Netanyahu propped up Hamas. Now it’s blown up in our faces | The Times of Israel
[11] Three suitcases stuffed with $15 million passed to Hamas in Gaza | The Jerusalem Post
[12] Israel sent suitcases of cash into Gaza for years despite concerns about funding Hamas
