Embedded journalism (Episode 5)
We will devote this fifth and final part of the series to the antithesis of journalism: embedded journalism (in French: journalisme “embarqué”, “intégré” or “rattaché”). Within an increasingly confrontational European lens on the world (particularly towards Russia) and the supposed role of “appeasement” and “responsibility” that the European Union (EU) is said to have to play in it, the European Commission is increasingly granting itself the right to resort to military-security means [1], such as embedded journalism. This may disgust citizens, but it should no longer surprise them. The question we must ask ourselves here: do the European institutions intend to extend the use of embedded journalism to civil society?
The origins
The termembedded journalism is a euphemism for “war propaganda” [2]. It is used to describe war journalism in which journalists are attached to one of the belligerent sides and their reports are submitted to, and approved (and therefore censored) by, the command of that party to the conflict [3], [4]. Invented by the US authorities following the media disaster that the Vietnam War was for them, the concept was developed during the war in Bosnia in 1995. It was used there for the first time, and then more systematically from 2003 onwards during the 2nd Iraq War [5], [6].
Beyond the physical dangers for the journalist, embedded journalism presents obvious dangers for journalistic objectivity and independence, and the possible biases are many [7]. For example, the imposition of a military rather than political view of conflicts, a bias in favour of the accompanying units and against the local population, etc. In short, it controls access to certain information rather than other information and favours a certain way of operating. As its name suggests,embedded journalism therefore mainly does one thing: it embeds journalism in a certain version of the facts and formats it as it pleases, whether in wartime or not. Admittedly, it is easier to control the message on the battlefield, if only for logistical or security reasons. But one can very well imagine scenarios in which the use of embedded journalism would be extended to civilian media projects, as… the European Commission is doing.
EUvsDisinfo: the European knight
Regarding the Iraq War, American generals such as Lt. Col. Rick Long did not hesitate to admit: “Frankly, our job is to win this war. That includes the information war. So we are going to try to dominate the information environment.” [8] (author's translation). What would have been said in Europe if a Russian soldier or official had said the same thing? It would have served as a pretext to “strengthen” European military means in order to “safeguard” us against Russian interference and propaganda. Except that here we can drop the conditional, because that is exactly what the Commission argued, referring to the Russian embassy's website [9].
The second episode of this series [10] showed how the EU, and in particular the Commission, used the construction of Russia as an external enemy in order to equip itself with military means of counter-propaganda. These are concentrated in the East StratCom Taskforce (ESTF) [11], attached to the EU's diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and operational specifically in Eastern Europe.
One of its bodies is the EUvsDisinfo [12]platform. At first glance, it looks like an independent journalistic platform. It is only at the very bottom of the home page, in the disclaimer, that one learns that EUvsDisinfo is a creation of the ESTF, but that what appears on the site supposedly does not necessarily reflect the official positions of the EU. Except that in its mission statement and its history [13], one learns that the ESTF set up EUvsDisinfo specifically to counter “disinformation by the Russian Federation” targeting the EU and the shared neighbouring countries, which casts doubt on its claimed independence and objectivity. However, one will learn nothing there about the leaders and employees of EUvsDisinfo, nor what its real budget is, nor what share of it comes from the EU.
Strategic objective…
Now, the ESTF is part of the EEAS, which in turn is subordinate to the office of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs. Since 2018, the EEAS has been specifically funded for its “strategic communication” services (a euphemism for “propaganda”), notably in Eastern Europe [14]. Moreover, this draft of the 2018 European budget sets out the motivations of the European Parliament, which clearly describes the “fight against disinformation” as well as “counter-disinformation” as one of the EU's objectives, with the ESTF in the role of headquarters:
“The preparatory action will test how to counter disinformation more systematically, effectively and efficiently. An important objective is to build a European capacity for verifying disinformation by increasing staff skills through training and coaching, through the appointment of strategic communication experts, who will then report on their monitoring activities to headquarters, including to the East StratCom Taskforce. (…) Strategic communication capacity (…) This term is intended to cover: (…) running and maintaining a network of counter-disinformation specialists in the Member States and neighbouring countries, and the exchange of best practices” (p. 33, 151, author's translation) [15]
In 2018, the “strategic communication” item (Item 2214) was included on an ad hoc basis in the EEAS budget, to the tune of €800,000 [16]. From the 2019 budget onwards, the objectives of the fight against disinformation and of counter-disinformation have had a regular place in the European budget, increasing year after year, first to €2 million (2019) [17] and up to €6 million (planned for 2023) [18]. EUvsDisinfo, moreover, has its offices at the same address as the EEAS [19]. And on top of all that, the name includes the English acronym for the EU.
… of a military nature
All this, however, has not yet demonstrated the military nature of EUvsDisinfo, one might object. Let us come to that. The ESTF takes part, among other things, in the G7 Rapid Alert System (RAS) [20]. The RAS was also created in 2018, seems to be linked to the US intelligence services, the CIA, and appears to be an instrument dedicated to spreading the Western narrative [21]. But above all, the ESTF's budget comes from the EEAS. And the latter includes an item of €9.2 million (2018) and more than €13.2 million (2023) earmarked for national experts “supervised” by military personnel. The EEAS website clearly states that the ESTF funds EUvsDisinfo and spends its budget on its cooperation activities, notably with NATO [22]. It only remains to find out what share of this spending on cooperation with military organisations benefits EUvsDisinfo.
EUvsDisinfo therefore appears to be an independent media outlet, but functions as a European, even military, state media outlet. EUvsDisinfo disseminates “journalistic” analyses and reports as well as opinions in the public sphere, whereas Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union formally prohibits public authorities (and therefore the European institutions) from interfering in public political debate [23]. The Commission admits as much in its own documents [24].
It therefore prefers to act stealthily. On the one hand, it delegates the work of censorship to the GAFAM by imposing a Code of Practiceon them. On the other, it casts itself as the creator of media trust indicators, thereby setting itself up as a supposedly impartial judge of objectivity and transparency [25], while it interferes through counter-propaganda platforms as untransparent as EUvsDisinfo. It is for these reasons that the platform has already been in the sights of the Dutch parliament, which called for its closure after several Dutch media outlets, listed by the platform as peddling “disinformation”, had filed complaints [26].
To justify all these actions, the Commission gets around the barrier of the Charter by arguing a complex cross-border danger undermining trust in the European institutions and democracy [27]. This justification, fabricated from scratch, thus serves, according to the Commission, as the basis for intervention at European level. But in reality it serves only to shield the European institutions from any form of criticism on a whole range of political subjects, presented by the Commission as “hybrid threats” [28]. These are said to be both external andinternalin nature. Which would therefore justify internalresponses, whose targets will be the European peoples, as we saw in episodes 3 [29] and 4 [30].
The Commission treats itself to some toys
The News Initiative [31] is one of these internal responses set up by the Commission. It is the first time that the EU's multiannual budget (2021-2027) has dedicated funds, via the Creative Europeprogramme, specifically to supporting the media. The initiative has a minimum of €75 million and a maximum of almost €121 million in European subsidies, divided into three major blocks, each comprising various projects put out to tender [32]. Like many European projects, the News Initiative is presented in a positive and consensual light, with fashionable words such as “innovation” and “competitiveness” [33]. To make it palatable to all, it stresses the need for a diverse, independent and pluralistic media space for European democracies. That is why it is enshrined in the Commission'sAction Plan for Democracy [34]. Who would dare to oppose that?
Already much less appealing is its emphasis on fighting “threats of disinformation” [35]. And that is precisely the catch. For projects that are commendable in themselves (e.g. the Rapid Response Mechanism [36], legal and financial aid for threatened journalists) sit alongside others that are far more sinister, such as that of the European Digital Monitoring Observatory (EDMO) [37], about which BAM! already wrote a year ago [38]. The amounts allocated to the various projects reveal the heart of the initiative: all the current projects for the protection of journalists and of media freedom and pluralism together amount to just over €14.3 million [39], while the EDMO project, which aims to establish an international network for observing disinformation campaigns, receives €11 million [40], on its own! The best-funded project, with €26 million at the very least, is a project that seeks to promote new media technologies, especially in the field of “virtual/augmented reality” [41]. Other major projects are information on European affairs via radio (€4.4 million [42]) and the television channel Euronews (€16 million [43]). An assessment of the initiative's major items leaves the impression that the innovation lies mainly in the fields of digitisation and internet surveillance, while the rest looks very much like business as usual (subsidies for radio and Euronews).
Independence in question
Even if commendable projects could be funded through this initiative, which is nothing other than a distribution of public money, how can one not believe they serve as an alibi? But the essential question is not even there. The essential question is: what guarantees are there for the independence of the projects funded and for non-interference by the European institutions? Do these guarantees exist in the event that journalistic information criticises the European institutions and falls into the sights of EU-funded disinformation hunters? For the News Initiative website clearly states that it wants to promote “reliable information on the EU” [44].
And who will be the judge of what constitutes “reliable information on the EU” in the event of a dispute? The GAFAM, to whom the Commission delegates the role of censors [45], [46]? Platforms such as EDMO, EU DisinfoLab [47] or EUvsDisinfo, created and funded by the EU and hunting down disinformation? The European institutions, which are biased, with their Action Plan for Democracy and their concept of “disinformation” with a more than dubious definition [48]? The courts? Let us note that even the European Court of Justice confirmed, after the fact, the ban on the Russian media RT and Sputnik decreed by the Commission without a mandate [49]. Will the media system the EU is building for itself really allow independent media? Or will it rather serve to embed journalism? Mistrust is called for.
By Colin Meier, citizen journalist and Germany correspondent at BAM!
[1] https://bam.news/societe/investigation/la-propagande-le-revers-poli-de-la-censure-la-russie-l-ennemi-exterieur
[2] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/opinion/embedded-journalism-a-distorted-view-of-war-2141072.html
[3] https://web.archive.org/web/20090902091331/http://www.militarycity.com/iraq/1631270.html
[4] https://web.archive.org/web/20030421055549/http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june03/embed_3-27.html
[5] https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt19qgf0x.11.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Abebfdc75d741fc7cb45a9d1fd00d6647&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1
[6] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/11/rupert-hamer-death-embed-risks or alternatively, here: https://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/index2.php?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fcommentisfree%2F2010%2Fjan%2F11%2Frupert-hamer-death-embed-risks#&
[7] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/opinion/embedded-journalism-a-distorted-view-of-war-2141072.html
[8] https://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_iraqmedia.shtml
[9] https://bam.news/societe/investigation/la-propagande-le-revers-poli-de-la-censure-la-russie-l-ennemi-exterieur
[10] Ibid.
[11] StratCom is the acronym for Strategic Communication.
[13] https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/
[14] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/129602/budg2018-doc6-txt-2-en.pdf
[15] Ibid.
[16] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2018/en/SEC10.pdf
[17] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2020/en/SEC10.pdf
[18] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2023/en/SEC10.pdf
[19] https://euvsdisinfo.eu/contact-us/
[20] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en#11248
[21] https://lecourrierdesstrateges.fr/2022/06/30/au-g7-macron-a-officiellement-accepte-que-la-cia-organise-la-propagande-occidentale-en-europe/
[22] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en#11248
[23] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_fr.pdf
[24] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&from=EN
[25] Ibid.
[26] https://euobserver.com/opinion/141458
[27] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&from=EN
[28] Ibid.
[29] Propaganda, the polished flip side of censorship: the people, the internal enemy (Episode 3)
[30] The grip of the “experts” (Episode 4)
[31] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/news-initiative
[32] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/funding-news-media-sector
[33] One may, moreover, ask why media would need to be put in competition with others. Are they not supposed to provide a public service by reporting information, facts and the truth? Should a public service not exist outside the spirit of competition? Is the truth then to be subject to the spirit of competition? With what? And how, moreover, would this be different or innovative compared with the existing media system, which has turned information into an object of competition and money?
[34] https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/european-democracy-action-plan_en#documents, or here: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf
[35] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/news-initiative
[36] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/crea-cross-2022-mfp-rapidresponse
[37] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/eight-proposals-selected-become-first-hubs-european-digital-media-observatory
[38] https://bam.news/en/investigation/episode-3-4-the-playground-of-the-gafam-and-the-political-world
[39] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/funding-media-freedom
[40] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/funding-engagement-media
[41] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/horizon-europe-call-proposals-innovation-media
[42] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/covering-eu-affairs-through-radio
[43] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/multimedia-actions
[44] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/news-initiative
[45] https://bam.news/en/investigation/episode-3-4-the-playground-of-the-gafam-and-the-political-world
[46] https://bam.news/en/articles/censorship-shamelessly-encouraged-by-the-european-authorities
[47] https://bam.news/en/investigation/episode-4-4-all-the-misery-in-the-world
[48] https://bam.news/societe/investigation/la-propagande-le-revers-poli-de-la-censure-la-russie-l-ennemi-exterieur
[49] https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2022-07/cp220132fr.pdf
Photo source:
© Colin Meier
We would like to thank Free21 for republishing this article on their website and in the first issue of 2023 of their print edition. Read all their articles in French thanks to the translation tool built directly into their website.
Quotations from English-language sources are translated back here from the French.
